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materials with recent cases to the extent he feels necessary to make it a "new"
course.
Mr. Gulliver is obviously sincere when he says in his Preface, "The main
stimulus [for this book], however, has been the enthusiastic reception of stu-
dents who have taken this course." If he has been complimented by his
students, he has more than repaid them by complimenting future generations
of law students with his most careful attention to their problems and his
infinite patience in directing his scholarship towards aiding them in solving
these problems. His teaching colleagues in this field are indebted to him
for giving us a means of expressing our like concern for our students, and
at the same time leaving us a flexibility in which to emphasize our individual
interests and judgments as to matters of current interest and importance in
this fascinating area of the law.
HENRY A. FENNt
PLANNING FOR FREEDOM: THE PUBLIc LAW OF AiERICAN CAPITALISM.
By Eugene V. Rostow. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. Pp. x,
437. $6.00.
To those who insist on viewing planning as the opposite of freedom, the
title of Dean Rostow's book will unquestionably be looked on as an anomaly-
perhaps a travesty. In the taxonomies of conservative and liberal alike, plan-
ning carries the connotation of delegating to central political authorities
functions which, in the absence of planning, individuals would carry out for
themselves. Orthodox conservatism characteristically deplores this delegation
of functions on the grounds that it reduces the area of individual freedom;
orthodox liberalism applauds it on the grounds that the social purpose attained
more than compensates for the loss of individual freedom involved. But both,
at least where economic matters are concerned, are prone to argue or concede
that as planning increases individual freedom must inevitably, in some measure,
recede.
The central thesis of Rostow's book-in many ways a great book-is that
the special brand of economic planning developed in the United States has
found its source in our hallowed principle of liberty under law: planning here
has been for freedom rather than an encroachment on freedom. This has re-
sulted primarily because virtually all the ingredients of what might legitimately
-albeit loosely-be called "planning" have come about through the vehicle
of public law. But Rostow's conclusion follows in part because of the tradi-
tional American concept of freedom: it has not been identified with the older
English-laissez-faire-in-contrast-with-the-state-dominated-app roach-of- Ger-
man-law movement, but instead has implied a society of consent. The body
of public law governing our economy, enacted with the consent of the gov-
erned, is consistent with this concept of freedom.
We turn now to the objectives and ingredients of American economic
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planning. The objectives, judging from the public law itself, are relatively
full-employment and economic growth under stable prices. From the legis-
lation designed to encourage railroad expansion and the settlement of public
lands, through the Interstate Commerce Commission Act, the Sherman Act,
the Federal Reserve Act, the income tax laws, the Pure Food and Drug laws,
legislation concerning labor and agriculture, and finally to the Employment
Act of 1946, all have in the main furthered one or more of these objectives.
There have, of course, been several miscues along the way: the N.I.R.A.
probably raised prices and reduced output and in consequence contributed
little if anything to ending the Great Depression; Fair Trade legislation
(against which Rostow has battled personally) encroached on freedom and
reduced marketing efficiency; and farm legislation has piled up wasteful sur-
pluses at exorbitant public costs. Nevertheless, the individual American citi-
zen of 196o, when he purchases an intricate chemical plant or an aspirin tablet,
is affected daily by much of this vast body of public law without sensing a
serious constraint on his individual freedom.
Moreover, planning through public law has been successful. The arsenal
of monetary and fiscal weapons now in the hands of public authorities can
keep economic fluctuations within tolerable limits, as prompt recoveries from
the 1949, 1954, and 1958 downturns demonstrate; labor legislation has sub-
stituted bargaining for brutality; the antitrust laws, the large volume of pro-
nouncements to the contrary notwithstanding, have made for more competitive
resource allocation and greater industrial vigor than characterized an earlier
era.
But Rostow would not have us believe that the American economy has
approached Utopia, only that "planning for freedom" has been sufficiently
successful to establish its primacy over the alternatives of an orthodox social-
istic plan or no plan. The future beckons us to reform the public law, not to
grope (backward or forward) for less promising systems of economic control.
Rostow offers his own program of reform: the Federal Reserve Board should
be given wider discretionary powers, especially over member bank reserve re-
quirements; state banking laws should be revised to take cognizance of the
fact that "for purposes of monetary policy, the United States should be a
nation not a federation of states." Patent laws are in need of revision. The
antitrust laws should be administered with greater vigor. The machinery of
public regulation needs overhauling. In other areas the public law should be
divested of its depression-born orientation; pension plans, seniority rules, re-
strictions on apprenticeships-even the social security system itself-often buy
security at an unnecessarily high cost in economic efficiency and loss of indi-
vidual freedom.
In these days when much liberal thought seems to be struggling weakly
and without notable success to extricate itself from the strong vice of the
New Deal era, Rostow's diagnosis and prescriptions for the American econ-
omy, themselves liberal in the finest liberal tradition, are delightfully refresh-
ing and highly persuasive. Orthodox liberal economists who casually accept
5 per cent inflation per year as a necessary concomitant of economic growth
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and near full employment can profitably ponder Chapter 14. Rostow argues
persuasively that inflation of this order not only is unnecessary but wreaks
much injustice. And those who imagine America as a society of crass un-
cultured commercialism, undeserving of freedom, may have their faith re-
kindled in Rostow's final chapter: "Is Freedom Interesting Enough ?" Rostow
argues convincingly that it is.
Rostow has drawn heavily on the disciplines of economic theory, law, and
history in producing this book and has employed all three with an expertise
worthy of the envy of professionals specializing in any one of them. The
result is a penetrating analysis of the American scene. And when a reviewer
finds an ideology compatible with his own presented so brilliantly, he is under-
standably reluctant to interrupt his applause, even with legitimate critical
comment. In his analysis of the business cycle Rostow argues that on both
theoretical and practical grounds the competitive model offers no relief to
periodic business depressions. As a matter of fact, wages and prices are much
too inflexible autonomously to adjust to declines in aggregate demand without
creating significant unemployment; but it is yet to be scientifically proved
that prolonged large-scale unemployment is a concomitant of a perfectly com-
petitive economy. Rostow finds an inconsistency in Schumpeter's argument on
the one hand that monoply power is essential to economic progress, and on
the other that monopoly power to slow up innovations is socially desirable.
Schumpeter's students, recalling his oft-repeated statement that "automobiles
go at break-neck speeds because they have brakes, not in spite of them," will
find no inconsistency here. And Rostow's omission of systematic treatment
of the economics of distribution leads him to conclude that "public law plan-
ning" has encroached on individual freedom less than is in fact the case. One
scarcely needs to be in the 90 per cent marginal tax bracket to be convinced
that public welfare measures are acquired at a price, and part of this price is
surely the individual's loss of freedom to dispose of a large percentage of his
current income as he wishes. Whether society values all such welfare measures
more highly than the loss of individual freedom they entail involves value
judgments, and debates among economists and among politicians alike make
it clear that society has pronounced no unanimous judgment on this matter.
But most would agree that some individual freedom is lost in the tax-for-
welfare process.
Five years ago Professor Samuel Stumpf in his Democratic Manifesto argued
that democratic values were losing in their race with communism primarily
because western scholars had been unable--or unwilling-to articulate a clear
philosophy of democracy. Rostow has contributed much toward remedying
this deficiency. His analysis of the economic and legal fabric of America makes
mid-twentieth century capitalism far more understandable and, perhaps of
much greater importance, far more preferable to alternative systems of eco-
nomic organization than its critics would have us believe.
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